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ABSTRACT
The Indian Child Welfare Act is a federal statute that applies to Indian
children who are at the center of child welfare proceedings. While the Indian
Child Welfare Act provides numerous protections to Indian children, parents,
and tribes, many of these cases play out in state courts which are also required
to apply their own requisite, relevant state laws. However, sometimes friction
between the Indian Child Welfare Act and state-law provisions arise where
state law provisions may seem in accord with the statute but actually contra-
dict it, such as in the case of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Chil-
dren. This Article surveys the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Chil-
dren's provisions and discusses the friction that exists between it and the
Indian Child Welfare Act. Ultimately, this Article argues that because the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is a state administrative pro-
cedure that may alter that status of child welfare proceedings, the Indian
Child Welfare Act should preempt the Compact where it is applicable.
*t Neoshia R. Roemer is the Fellow at the Indigenous Law and Policy Center at the Michigan State
University College of Law. She would like to thank Barbara Creel, Kathryn Fort, Matthew Fletcher,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario: you live in State A. You learn that through invol-
untary court proceedings, State B has removed your grandchildren from their
parents with the intent to terminate parental rights. The children are eligible
for enrollment in an Indian tribe. Because of their status, the Indian Child
Welfare Act ("ICWA")i applies to the children's placement. In State B, and
as ICWA outlines, the children's tribe determines that it would be in the best
interests of the children to place them in your care. Great! You look forward
1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012).
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to taking your grandchildren, possibly adopting them, and helping them move
forward and build a life in your care in State A.
However, there is just one problem: in nearly all cases, before the chil-
dren can be moved from temporary foster care in State B to your care in State
A, both states must complete an evaluation under the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children ("ICPC"). In a home evaluation, the State B social
worker assigned to visit you arbitrarily decides that your home would not be
best-suited to the children. Based on the State B social worker's evaluation,
the ICPC has essentially invalidated the tribe's placement preference. The
children can no longer be placed in your care, even though the tribe, the court
of concurrent jurisdiction, wants to place the children in your care. While the
courts complied with the federal ICWA and gold standard placement prefer-
ences, a state compact-a cordial agreement hat states have agreed to adopt
into state law and administer through their agencies-has eliminated the
chances of you receiving your grandchildren without much chance for re-
view. Now the tribe will have no choice other than to place your grandchil-
dren elsewhere for the purposes of adoption, further breaking up the family
and eroding kinship ties. Even the federal law intended to keep your family
together cannot save your family from destruction now.
The above scenario is more than just a hypothetical; it is the current state
of child placement and adoption procedures when Indian children are placed
across state lines. The application of the ICPC in ICWA cases occurs through
an administrative procedure, tying a trial judge's hands until the appropriate
state administrative office conducts the ICPC evaluation and approves a
placement. As applied to Indian children, there is certain, unavoidable con-
flict between the ICPC and ICWA because it is unclear whether the state
administrative procedure that regulates the placement of children across state
lines or the federal law that directs the placement of Indian children should
prevail. Scenarios where the ICPC and ICWA both apply exist in a gray area.
Although these two laws both purport to further the goals of child welfare,
there is a conflict between the laws. The regulation of standards for the place-
ment of a child is an area of law traditionally left to the states, leaving federal
courts to generally abstain in these matters. But where Indian children are
involved, Congress has exercised its trust responsibility to Indian tribes to
promote tribal sovereignty by protecting children from excessive placements
outside of their families and tribal communities.2 Where a state follows
ICWA placement preferences, or a tribe desires to place a child out of state,
2. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706 (1992) (discussing how the doctrine of
abstention "might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship even when
the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody"); see also Indian Child Welfare Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
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the receiving state may deny the placement. The denial of such a placement
makes ICWA's mandate and tribal preferences moot.
Prioritizing the ICPC over ICWA makes several dangerous presump-
tions. First, it presumes to interfere with tribal sovereignty where a tribe is
forced to comply with this state procedure to place one of its children. Sec-
ond, it presumes that a tribal or state entity following ICWA's mandate has
not adequately ensured a child's safety. Third, it presumes that a state agency
has the authority to implement policies that interfere with a federal substan-
tive law. Even though agencies generally have the power to interpret a law
where it is ambiguous or implement policy to achieve their goals, ICWA is
not ambiguous, nor does the ICPC help to achieve agency goals. State agen-
cies should not have the power to implement policies that afford a state ad-
ministrative procedure power to potentially override federal, or state, law.
Thus, the ICPC unequivocally should not apply in ICWA cases. In fact,
ICWA essentially already achieves what the ICPC does without the inter-
meddler state.
Therefore, this Article argues the ICPC does not and should not apply
where its application renders ICWA and its principles null-further disad-
vantaging Indian children and injuring Indian families. First, this Article be-
gins with a survey of the most recent ICPC guidelines. Second, this Article
moves into a survey of the individual states that have enacted the ICPC, fo-
cusing on the variations in applicable provisions and case law that impact,
intersect, and conflict with ICWA. Third, this Article considers how the ICPC
and ICWA work together through tribal-state compacts, state administrative
procedure, and case law. And finally, this Article discusses the legal impli-
cations of the conflict between the ICPC and ICWA before concluding.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE INDIAN CHID WELFARE ACT OF
1978
Enacted by Congress in 1978, ICWA is a federal substantive and proce-
dural law that governs the removal and placement of Indian children in both
voluntary and involuntary proceedings.3 Historically, ICWA was a remedy
for the genocidal effect that decades of federally-sanctioned removal pro-
grams caused in removing Indian children from their families and communi-
ties.4 Prior to 1978, federal and state programs often called for the removal
3. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
4. See id. § 1902 ("The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
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of Indian children in deadly assimilationist projects aimed to solve the "In-
dian problem."5 Oftentimes, children were removed to religious orphanages
or boarding schools, where leaders brutalized them in attempts to remove
their indigeneity.6 Because government officials often removed Indian chil-
dren from their homes during their formative years, Indian children in board-
ing schools often did not receive education in their culture and native lan-
guages, leading to a gap in cultural knowledge and near cultural genocide for
many tribes in the United States.7 Moreover, the boarding school atmos-
phere-lacking in the attention and affection young children require-also
lent itself to harsh physical and sexual abuse.8
To remedy the violent cultural devastation the removal of Indian chil-
dren from their homes caused, Congress enacted ICWA to give tribes more
power over child placement outcomes.9 In its findings prior to enacting
ICWA, the Senate found that the separation of Indian children from their
families created a "socially and culturally" undesirable situation in which In-
dian children faced the loss of identity.o The Senate recognized that the spe-
cial trust relationship that the United States government held with Indian
tribes required a remedy for this problem. " Therefore, Congress imple-
mented ICWA, intending it to create fairer procedures for Indian children and
families that acknowledged their specific cultural needs.
Today, ICWA governs cases involving both the voluntary placement
away from and the involuntary removal of Indian children from their fami-
lies, and often times, their tribal communities. ICWA applies to child custody
matters in four scenarios: (1) foster care placement, (2) termination of
unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of
child and family service programs.").
5. MARGARET D. JACOBS, A GENERATION REMOVED: THE FOSTERING AND ADOPTION OF
INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 5 (2014).
6. Id. at 13; see also Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. RJ, 221 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1319-20 (D. Utah 2016) (declining to declare the Navajo Nation had
a lack of jurisdiction to hear a case filed by a former child participant in the Mormon Indian Place-
ment Program, citing physical and sexual abuse in the program where Indian children were placed
in Mormon homes).
7. JACOBS, supra note 5, at 13.
8. Id.
9. See supra note 4.
10. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1-2 (1977).
11. Id; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530
("[Ilt is the policy of this Nation, in fulfillment of its special responsibility and legal obligations to
the American Indian people, to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the sta-
bility and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum federal standards
for the removal of Indian children form their families and the placement of such children in foster
or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .").
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parental rights, (3) pre-adoptive placement, and (4) adoptive placement.12
ICWA applies where a child is enrolled in an Indian tribe or the child's parent
is an enrolled member and the child is eligible for enrollment.13 ICWA sets
forth procedural requirements that states must, at a minimum, follow in either
voluntary or involuntary child custody proceedings.14 Under ICWA, a volun-
tary proceeding is a proceeding where a parent "voluntarily consents to a fos-
ter care placement or to termination of parental rights."'5 However, involun-
tary proceedings are generally court proceedings where a state has
commenced proceedings against parents to remove a child in a variety of in-
stances, including, but not limited to, child abuse.16 In any case, ICWA con-
tinues to require state courts to meet certain procedural and substantive re-
quirements in placing Indian children.
A. ICWA's PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Moreover, ICWA contains procedural provisions that vest tribes with
exclusive jurisdiction in child placement matters, absent good cause to the
contrary.17 That is, ICWA vests original jurisdiction in child placement mat-
ters when Indian children are involved in tribal courts-unless the parent ob-
jects or there is good cause to leave the matter to state court adjudication.18
Because many Native Americans live outside the boundaries of Indian Coun-
try, state courts are often involved in child placement decisions from the start,
prompting an evaluation of whether ICWA requires tribal involvement
and/or transfer to tribal court. In either voluntary or involuntary proceedings,
state courts are required to submit notice to a child's presumed tribe.19 Addi-
tionally, tribes maintain the right to intervene in these matters.20
In addition to ICWA's jurisdictional requirements and its affirmation
that tribes have the right to intervene in child placement matters affecting
their children, ICWA also outlines a process, including evidentiary standards,
which courts must follow in the placement of Indian children. For example,
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012).
13. Id. § 1903(4).
14. See id. §§ 1912 (discussing involuntary proceedings), 1913 (discussing voluntary proceed-
ings).
15. Id. § 1913(a).
16. See id. § 1912(a), (f). But see Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 650 (2013)
(defining involuntary proceedings more narrowly to include only removal of Indian children from
their already established families).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b).
18. Id.
19. Id § 1912(a).
20. Id. § 1911(c).
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prior to terminating a parent's rights, the state agency must provide remedial
services, or preventative measures, to parents.2 1 Additionally, a court may
not terminate a parent's right without first hearing testimony from a qualified
expert witness and making a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the par-
ent's continued custody of the child will result in "serious emotional or phys-
ical damage to the child."22 Similarly, where a child is to be placed into foster
care, a state court must make similar findings, including testimony from a
qualified expert witness, supported by clear and convincing evidence.23
Where a higher evidentiary standard is applicable under federal or state law,
ICWA requires that the court use the higher evidentiary standard to provide
the greatest protections to parental rights.24 Procedurally, ICWA's eviden-
tiary standards are important because they tend to provide greater protections
to parents of Indian children than traditional state legal standards.25
B. ICWA's SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
Where a child is removed from his or her parent's care, ICWA provides
a placement-preference order that courts must adhere to. A child who is
placed in foster care, or in a pre-adoptive placement, must be placed consid-
ering the following order of preferences: (1) an extended family member; (2)
a foster home approved by the child's tribe; (3) an Indian foster home; or (4)
an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe with programs suitable
to meet the Indian child's needs.26 For a child who is placed for adoption,
preference is given in the following order: (1) an extended family member;
(2) other members of the child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.27 While
the placement preferences can vary depending upon a child's status, ICWA
definitively states that these are the placement preferences a court must fol-
low "in the absence of good cause to the contrary."28 Thus, ICWA's place-
ment preferences are a mandate that state courts generally must follow. 29
While all states are required to follow the basic requirements of ICWA,
states such as Michigan and Minnesota have codified ICWA into their own
21. Id. § 1912(f).
22. Id.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
24. Id. § 1921.
25. See In re K.S.D., 2017 ND 289, 124, 904 N.W.2d 479 ("ICWA does not alter the require-
ments for state law proceedings, but instead requires an additional finding with a higher burden of
proof in cases involving termination of parental rights to Indian children.").
26. 25 U.S.C.§ 1915(b).
27. Id § 1915(a).
28. Id § 1915(a)-(b).
29. See Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 395 P.3d 286, 290 (Ariz. 2017).
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state law.30 Although these states have codified ICWA into state law and will
look toward state statutes first, these states generally use federal statutes to
fill any gaps that the state statutes may not address.3 1 Thus, in cases where
the ICPC also applies, ICWA's provisions on child placement preferences
are crucial, and sometimes, in conflict.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN
The ICPC sets out administrative procedural requirements for the trans-
fer of children at the center of child custody matters and adoptions across
state lines. The compact requires states to retain responsibility for minors
who are to be or have been placed outside of their home, or sending, state.32
First drafted in the late 1950s by a group of social service administrators, the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is a binding agreement
among states to address child safety and jurisdictional concerns over place-
ment monitoring when placing a child across state lines.33 Though the ICPC
is similar to a uniform law, Congress has neither approved nor enacted the
ICPC because the compact, made among states over a matter of state law,
does not require congressional action.34
Typically, the ICPC is a mechanism that allows state administrative
agencies to share information with each other to direct the placement of chil-
dren across state lines.35 The ICPC centers on the state agency action of re-
moving and placing children.36 Additionally, the ICPC vests the power to
investigate and accept and/or decline a proposed placement in state
30. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712B (2018); MINN. STAT. §§ 260.751-260.835 (2018).
31. See generally In re K.M.N., 309 Mich.App. 274, 293, 870 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. 2015) (com-
paring Michigan's state ICWA statute with the federal statute to determine that a state ICWA law
further promoted ICWA's goals to protect an Indian child's culture and its purpose was consistent
with ICWA and ICWA's lesser protections did not preempt the state statute); see also In re S.P.K.,
911 N.W.2d 821, 829-30 (Minn. 2018) (comparing Minnesota's state ICWA law with the federal
statute to determine the constitutionality of the state statute's termination of parental rights provi-
sions).
32. See AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS'N, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN 10 (2002) [hereinafter Guide to the ICPC], http://guardianadli-
tem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ICPC-2002-Guidebook-with-financial-legal-highlights.pdf
(reprinting the 2002 version of the ICPC as drafted, prior to state adoption or enactment).
33. Id. at 3; Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REv. 292, 294-95 (1989).
34. Cf Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 3.
35. Vivek S. Sankaran, Out ofState and Out ofLuck: The Treatment ofNon-Custodial Parents
Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 63, 69
(2006).
36. See id. at 68-69.
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agencies.37 As states have individually adopted and enacted the ICPC, the
compact has allowed administrative agencies to direct the placement of chil-
dren across state lines outside of an adjudicative process.38 Although each
state has adopted the ICPC in its entirety, some states have further expanded
the ICPC's terms and the powers that administrative agencies have in deter-
mining whether a child's placement is appropriate.39 Therefore, as an admin-
istrative procedure, the ICPC is an extrajudicial process.
In directing the placement of children across state lines, the ICPC re-
quires that the sending agency send the receiving state a written notice.40 The
sending agency is the state, officer of the state, or state agency that wishes to
send a child to another state, and the receiving state is the state where the
child is to be sent.4 1 The written notice must contain: (1) the name of the
child, his/her place of birth, and the date of birth; (2) the identity and address
of the child's parent or legal guardian; (3) the name and address of the person
or agency with whom the sending state wishes to place the child; and (4) the
reasons why the sending state wishes to make the placement and evidence
supporting the placement.42 Additionally, the receiving state is entitled to re-
quest and receive any further information necessary for the placement.43
Once a receiving state has reviewed all this information and has determined
that the proposed placement is in the child's best interests, the sending state
may then place the child.44 To ensure states meet these requirements, the
ICPC requires that each state have an officer who facilitates the placement of
children across state lines under its guidelines.4 5
In all cases, the receiving state must agree to the placement of the child
in its state.46 Thus, the ICPC allows receiving states to reject the placement
of a child in its state based on its own analysis of the child's best interest,
regardless of the sending state's findings. Depending upon state law, the
37. Id at 69.
38. See id
39. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.711 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-10-9 (2018); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.20 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1000 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.34.010 (2018).
40. Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 11.
41. Id. at 10. Here, "sending agency" and "sending state" are used interchangeably.
42. Id
43. Id at 11.
44. Id
45. Id at 12.
46. See Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 11 ("The child shall not be sent ... into the
receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending
agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the
interests of the child.").
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JCPC may apply in child welfare cases, custody cases, foster care placements,
and adoptive placements.47 Generally, each type of case is subject to its own
rules and procedures to protect a parent's rights. However, the ICPC is
broader than the rules and procedures that already govern these proceedings.
A. SURVEY OF STATE ICPC STATUTES 4 8
Under Article II(a) of the ICPC, the compact applies only to foster care
placements and placements for the purpose of adoption.49 Some states, such
as California and North Carolina, have vehemently ascribed to the principle
that the ICPC applies only where the out-of-state placement is for foster care
or is preliminary to adoption. However, many states have adopted nonbind-
ing, administrative ICPC guidelines that call for its application even where
the placement is with a biological parent living out of state.50
The ICPC does not include language on whether it applies to placements
with a child's biological parent who lives across state lines, and many states
do not apply the ICPC to these placements. California has declined to apply.
the notice provisions of the ICPC to a child's placement with his biological
parent in another state.51 In Kentucky, the ICPC does not apply to a child's
placement across state lines when that placement is with a noncustodial par-
ent, where the sending state: (1) establishes the noncustodial parent has a
substantial relationship with the parent; (2) makes a finding, in writing, that
the placement is in the child's best interest; and (3) agrees to dismiss its ju-
risdiction over the case.52
Other states tightly regulate placement of children across state lines and
apply the ICPC even where the placement is with a noncustodial parent. Alt-
hough Arizona's ICPC contains a provision defining placement as a "family
free" home,53 Arizona courts have construed the ICPC to apply even where
a placement is with a noncustodial parent because it is in a dependent child's
best interests to ensure his or her placement in the receiving state is safe.54 In
47. Id. at 4.
48. See id. As previously noted, some states maintain an ICPC code that is very basic, reflect-
ing the original iteration of the document, while other states have expanded their ICPC. Thus, the
states surveyed in this section are states that vary from the ICPC's language on the placement of
children in their receiving state.
49. Id. at 10.
50. See Sankaran, supra note 35, at 73.
51. See In re C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) ("[A]n out-of-state place-
ment with a parent is never subject to the ICPC.") (emphasis in original).
52. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 615.030 art. 111(e) (West 2018) (effective June 25, 2013).
53. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-548 art. 11(d) (2018).
54. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513, 522 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) ("It is
in the best interests of a child who is the subject of a dependency proceeding and in the custody of
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Massachusetts, the code draws seemingly nonsensical distinctions for when
the ICPC applies to a child's placement with a noncustodial parent. For ex-
ample, where a parent in custody proceedings agrees to a child's placement
or the court places the child with her out-of-state, noncustodial parent, Mas-
sachusetts does not apply the ICPC.55 Conversely, Massachusetts does apply
the ICPC where a family court alters or amends a child's placement in a pre-
viously adjudicated family law proceeding and places the child with the out-
of-state, noncustodial parent.56 Where the nature of the proceeding changes,
so does the ICPC's applicability.
As Massachusetts demonstrates, states that apply the ICPC to a child's
placement with a noncustodial parent who lives out of state create barriers to
a parent's exercise of the right to the care, custody, and control of his or her
child - violating a biological parent's due process rights.57 For example, the
state does not usually become involved in a child custody dispute between
two parents unless there are allegations that one or both parents are unfit.
States that apply the ICPC to placements of children with their biological
parents essentially make an automatic presumption of the receiving parent's
unfitness, circumventing the usual requirement of actual allegations of the
parent's unfitness.58 Applying the ICPC to a placement with an out-of-state,
biological parent is therefore fundamentally unfair and violates the right to
protective services to require an investigation by a receiving state on the suitability of a parent who
does not have full custodial rights before placing the child with that parent."). But see In re CB.,
116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 296 ("We find the decisions in California and elsewhere holding that the ICPC
does not apply to be far better reasoned than those holding that it does. . . . We are publishing this
opinion, however, to point out that the resulting lack of uniformity is dysfunctional, that courts and
rule makers have not been able to fix it, and hence that it may call for a multistate legislative re-
sponse.").
55. See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.507(1), (3) (2018).
56. Id. 7.507(2).
57. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000); see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, In re Sanders
and the Resurrection of Stanley v. Illinois, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 383, 388 (2014) (discussing how
the ICPC interferes with a parent's fundamental right to parent); Sankaran, supra note 35, at 68-69
(arguing that where states apply the ICPC to placements with biological parents, the ICPC limits a
biological parent's fundamental right to parent because purely administrative procedures may bar
placement with a biological parent on the ICPC's requisite considerations, which the home state is
otherwise not compelled to consider in making a determination on placement).
58. See Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (applying the
ICPC to a child's placement with out-of-state, noncustodial parent after child became a dependent
child). But see In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 537-38 (Mich. 2014) (holding that a state must
adjudicate a parent's unfitness before interfering with his or her rights, and that adjudicating one
parent to be unfit is not sufficient to declare the other unfit). See generally Sankaran, supra note 35
(arguing that state intervention under the ICPC in child placements with biological parents disre-
gards a parent's fundamental right to parent simply because he or she lives across state lines, even
where there is no allegation of abuse).
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parent, especially when there is no hearing on the matter and the evaluation
is not fully adjudicated.59
Under Article VIII(a) of the ICPC, where a parent has decided to place
a child out of state with other family members, the ICPC does not apply.60
Some states, such as Ohio and Kentucky, have adopted this principle and do
not apply the ICPC where a biological parent has voluntarily determined to
place the child in an out-of-state home.61 In Kentucky, the sending state may
request a determination of whether a placement with a family member qual-
ifies as a placement under the ICPC.62 Massachusetts, on the other hand, ap-
plies the ICPC even to a parent's voluntary placement of a child with out-of-
state family members.63 And where a placement is with family, other states
such as California and North Carolina do not apply the ICPC unless the out-
of-state placement is for foster care or is preliminary to adoption.64
Ultimately, the receiving state has the final word on a child's placement
from a sending state.65 As a matter of policy, involving the receiving state is
meant to ensure that the placement is in the child's best interest and that a
child is safe in his or her placement, especially since the sending state remains
responsible for funding a child's placement.66 If a receiving state does not
believe a placement is in the child's best interests and denies a placement,
some states allow for a remedy. For example, Kentucky law allows sending
states, or any interested party, to seek an administrative review of the deci-
sion.67
59. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) ("[P]arents are constitutionally entitled to
a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.") (emphasis added).
60. Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 12.
61. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 615.030 art. VIII(a) (West 2018) (effective July 12, 2012)
("The sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by his parent, stepparent, grandparent,
adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such
relative or non-agency guardian in the receiving state."); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.20
art. III(B)(4) (West 2018) ("The provisions of this compact shall not apply to . . . [t]he placement
of a child with a non-custodial parent provided that: (a) The non-custodial parent proves to the
satisfaction of a court in the sending state a substantial relationship with the child; and (b) The court
in the sending state makes a written finding that placement with the non-custodial parent is in the
best interests of the child; and (c) The court in the sending state dismisses its jurisdiction over the
child's case.").
62. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 615.030 art. V(6) (West 2018) (effective June 25, 2013).
63. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.507(3) (2018).
64. See In re C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that California
courts recognize the application of the ICPC where the placement is a substitute for parental care).
65. Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 10.
66. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513, 520 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) ("The
ICPC best safeguards a child's welfare by requiring the receiving state to investigate and monitor
the placement.").
67. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 615.030 art. VI(3).
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Some states even include provisions in their ICPC that apply specifically
to Indian children. Kentucky, for instance, allows the sending state to termi-
nate its jurisdiction under a variety of circumstances, including where an In-
dian tribe has petitioned for and received jurisdiction over a custody matter
involving an Indian child.68 However, in Washington, where the state code is
silent on how the ICPC and ICWA work together, administrative procedures
have closed the gap.69 Washington's Child Administration has interpreted the
ICPC to apply where an Indian child is involved.70 When the Children's Ad-
ministration sends an Indian child out of state, or a tribe with jurisdiction over
the matter requests an ICPC investigation, ICPC placement procedures must
be followed.71 Thus, if the state has retained jurisdiction over an Indian
child's placement for any reason, the ICPC must be followed prior to placing
the child with anyone out of state, including biological parents, relatives, fos-
ter homes, adoptive homes, or residential facilities.
Unsurprisingly, the ICPC placement evaluation can take a considerable
amount of time to complete. The ICPC regulations, which states are not re-
quired to adopt, provide guidance on the amount of time appropriate for pro-
cessing routine referrals, home studies, and priority placements.72 Generally,
the ICPC calls for state administrative offices to process referrals within three
working days.73 Under Regulation No. 2, for the placement of a child for
foster care or adoptive placement, an interstate home study should be com-
pleted within sixty days of the home study request.74 Regulation No. 2 does
permit the receiving state to request more time to complete the home study
when a scenario like unmet licensing requirements for foster parents must be
met for the home study.75 Though Regulation No. 2 is not binding on states
that have not adopted the regulations, the Social Security Act also requires
completed home studies for interstate placements within sixty days-and this
68. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 615.030 art. IV(4)(f).
69. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.34.010 (2018) (lacking guidance on how to apply the
ICPC to Indian children), with WASH. STATE DEP'T OF Soc. & HEALTH SERVS., PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES GUIDE: INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN PLACED OUT-OF-
STATE 5601(l)(a)(i)(B) (2014) ("Sending an Indian child out-of-state if Children's Administration
(CA) has jurisdiction or the Tribe has jurisdiction and would like to request an ICPC. The Tribe
must agree to follow the content of the ICPC and the receiving state/Tribe agrees to complete the
ICPC process as a courtesy.").
70. WASH. STATE DEP'T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., supra note 69, at 5601(1)(a)(i)(A)
(2014).
71. Id.
72. See INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN REGULATIONS §§ 4(7)(b),
2(7)(a), 2(8)(a) (AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. Ass'N 2012).
73. Id. § 4(7)(b).
74. Id. § 2(7)(a).
75. See id. § 2(7)(b).
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requirement is tied to federal funding.76 However, this sixty-day timeframe
is not for the placement approval or denial. Regulation No. 2 provides 180
days for the receiving state to approve or deny the interstate placement.
77
For placements with family members, the ICPC's Regulation No. 7 pro-
vides for an expedited placement process.78 In order for Regulation No. 7 to
apply, child welfare proceedings must result in: the child becoming a ward
of the court, the child no longer being in the home the court removed the child
from, and the court-ordered placement being an interstate placement with a
family member.79 Additionally, the child must be either (1) in an unexpected
dependency due to incarceration or incapacitation; (2) four years old or
younger; (3) placed with a sibling who has a substantial relationship with the
placement; or (4) currently in an emergency placement.80 Regulation No. 7
also allows the sending state to request a provisional placement.
81 If the re-
ceiving state issues a provisional approval, the child may be placed immedi-
ately.82 If the receiving state issues a provisional denial, the receiving state
will conduct a more extensive home study.83 Within twenty business days of
the referral, the receiving state must issue the provisional approval or de-
nial.84
B. JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICPC
Article V of the ICPC is the compact's jurisdictional provision. Article
V states:
The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient
to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care,
and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had
remained in the sending agency's state, until the child is adopted,
reaches majority, becomes elf-supporting or is discharged with the
concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state.
Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the
return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody
pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have financial
76. See Social Security Act § 471(a)(26)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(26)(A)(i) (2012).
77. See ICPC REGULATIONS § 2(8)(a).
78. Id § 7(3) (declining to apply this regulation to foster care or adoptive placements).
79. Id. § 7(5).
80. Id
81. Id. § 7(6).
82. Id- § 7(6)(d), (e).
83. ICPC REGULATIONS § 7(6)(f).
84. Id. § 7(9)(e).
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responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the
period of the placement . . . .85
Therefore, the ICPC allows sending states to retain jurisdiction over and fi-
nancial responsibility for a child's placement, regardless of the nature of the
proceedings.86 Because the ICPC is an administrative mechanism that only
allows a sending state to retain jurisdiction over and responsibility for the
placement of a child in the receiving state, a state court may not confer juris-
diction through the ICPC.87 However, the ICPC does allow the sending state
to extend its jurisdictional reach into another state through the retention of
jurisdiction over a child's placement.88 The ICPC allows sending states to
retain jurisdiction until a child is adopted, reaches the age of majority, be-
comes self-supporting, or is discharged.89 Where a jurisdictional conflict
arises after the child's placement, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") applies, not the ICPC.90
IV. THE COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT OF THE ICPC AND
ICWA
A. PLACEMENT-PREFERENCE CONFLICTS
In this context, placement preferences refer to where a child should be
placed if his or her parent is no longer fit, the parent is no longer able to take
care of the child, or the child is placed for adoption. The capability of the
foster care system in a state making a decision as to a child's placement de-
pends on many factors, including availability of licensed homes and funding.
The American foster care system is notoriously lacking in its ability to care
for the children in its care, including funding for placements, providing over-
sight for placements, and ensuring that placements are safe and appropriate.91
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act provides for the federal government
to match the funds that states expend for foster care and adoption
85. Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at I1-12 (emphasis added).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Hartfield, supra note 33, at 296.
89. Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 11.
90. See In re Adoption of Asente, 734 N.E.2d 1224, 1231-32 (Ohio 2000) (holding that juris-
diction must be conferred in accordance with the UCCJEA's predecessor, not the ICPC, because
the ICPC does not provide for jurisdiction in adoption matters).
91. See Anarida Delaj et al., Adoption and Foster Care, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 157, 187-88
(2018) (discussing the current problems with the foster care system, including disproportionate re-
moval of poor and minority children, shortage of foster homes, and problems facing children with
disabilities); see also Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32 (noting lack of oversight as a reason the
ICPC is necessary).
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placements.92 Title IV-E ensures that foster families receive individual pay-
ments for children in their care.93 Additionally, Title IV-E payments apply to
kinship care, or placements with family members, when they become perma-
nent.94 To receive Title IV-E matching funds, states agreed to enter into in-
terstate compacts, like the ICPC, to promote uniformity in interstate place-
ments.95
In addition to requiring interstate compacts, Title IV-E funds are tied to
stipulations that states must meet, such as ensuring involuntary placements
are in the best interest of the child.96 Title IV-E also requires state agencies
receiving funds to demonstrate that they are making reasonable efforts to
keep a family unified, creating and finalizing permanency plans at the appro-
priate stage of a placement, conducting in-home placement visits for no
longer than six months, conducting reviews and permanency hearings, and
creating appropriate licensing standards.97 To demonstrate they meet these
requirements, states must submit a plan to the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services for approval.98 Indian tribes are also
eligible and must generally meet the same requirements as states to receive
Title IV-E funding to place children in foster care, adoptive care, and kinship
care placements.99
Even though the ICPC is a state mechanism, Title IV-E requirements
link joining the ICPC to federal funding for foster care and adoption place-
ments. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of a placement decision
remains the funding and determining who will provide the funding for a child
placement. Under the ICPC, the sending state retains financial responsibility
for the placement for its duration.10 0 If for some reason the sending state loses
or relinquishes its jurisdiction to the receiving state, then the receiving state
assumes jurisdiction-and financial responsibility for the child.'0 In tribal
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679 (2012) (providing for funding for foster care programs).
93. Id § 672(a); see also D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that §
672(a) provides an individually enforceable right to foster care maintenance funds).
94. Glisson, 847 F.3d at 384 ("But kinship guardianship assistance applies only when the rel-
ative becomes the child's permanent guardian, not while the child is in temporary status.").
95. 42 U.S.C. § 673a.
96. See id. § 672(e) (requiring a best interest of the child analysis in any case where a child's
placement lasts longer than 180 days).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2018).
98. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.20(a) (2018).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 679c(b).
100. See Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 10.
101. Id.
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ICWA placements, Title IV-E funds follow a child in foster care place-
ment.102
Though the ICPC and ICWA have a similar funding source, most state
laws are silent as to whether the ICPC provisions apply to ICWA placement
preferences. Thus, the application of the ICPC in ICWA cases becomes a
matter of state administrative procedure. Generally, administrative law al-
lows an executive branch agency to fill gaps-within reason-where they
exist in substantive law to further the goal of applying the law through rule-
making, which includes implementing interpretative policies and proce-
dures.103 With regards to ICWA, these interpretive measures and policies
come through regulations and guidelines that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
("BIA") promulgates.104 In addition to the BIA's regulations and guidelines,
ICWA also encourages states to produce interpretative policies and proce-
dures through the use of tribal-state compacts.os
At its core, the ICPC aims to ensure children are placed in safe out-of-
state homes that are in their best interests, but its application in ICWA cases
assumes that ICWA and tribal placement preferences have not taken into ac-
count the Indian child's best interests and safety. Perhaps one of the most
important aspects of ICWA is the placement preferences it provides to state
courts. State courts must notify a child's tribe when he or she is involved in
dependency or adoption proceedings, and generally, the child's tribe must
approve of the proposed placement for the child.106 In descending order of
preference, ICWA requires state agencies to place the child (1) with family
members, including extended and/or non-Native blood relatives; (2) with a
tribe-approved placement; or (3) in another placement.1 07 Therefore, ICWA
102. See In re S.B.C., 2014 MT 345, n.2, 377 Mont. 400, n.2, 340 P.3d 534, n.2 (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 671-679(b)) ("Title IV-E is an entitlement program authorized under the Social Security
Act that provides federal funding to assist states and Indian Tribes in providing foster care, adoption
assistance, and kinship caregiver payments for children who meet the program's eligibility crite-
ria."); see also In re Hanna, 2010 MT 38, ¶ 19, 355 Mont. 236, ¶ 19, 227 P.3d 596, 1 19 (holding
that a tribal-state memorandum of agreement permitting the use of Title IV-E funds for tribal place-
ments valid).
103. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the notice require-
ments and rulemaking process under the federal Administrative Procedure Act). Additionally, most
states have similar provisions that allow state administrative agencies to create administrative pro-
cedures for state law.
104. 25 U.S.C. § 23.107 (2012).
105. See id. § 1919(a).
106. Id. § 1915(c).
107. Id. § 1915(b).
2019] 165
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
substantively requires that states follow this order of placement preferences
absent good cause not to follow them or a tribal resolution to the contrary.I0 8
1. The ICPC as an Administrative Procedure: Tribal-State
Compacts and State Regulations
In addition to providing these explicit placement preferences for states
to follow, ICWA also allows tribes and states to enter into compact agree-
ments that direct and define how ICWA cases will proceed within that re-
spective jurisdiction.109 Similar to the ICPC, these compacts are not codified
law, but both jurisdictions agree to enforce their provisions. Thus, these Sec-
tion 1919 compacts are cooperative agreements that ICWA allows to help
states and tribes fill gaps in the statute's procedural requirements by coming
to agreements on their own terms.1 10 As of December 2016, thirty-nine tribal-
state compacts existed, and those compacts involved thirty-seven tribes and
ten states.111 Even so, a state court may not always afford the tribal-state
compact the same rigid enforcement as statutory law in an ICWA case.
1 12
Nevada actually interprets Section 1919 to mean that the state and the tribe
can enter into an agreement on placement preferences on a literal case-by-
case basis, not just a general agreement like other states such as Michigan,
Minnesota, Alaska, and Washington have.113
Compact agreements can provide guidance on how the ICPC works with
ICWA to place an Indian child during ICWA proceedings. Michigan and
Minnesota, both of whom have enacted state level Indian Child Welfare Acts,
have tribal-state ICWA compact agreements that discuss how to apply the
ICPC in ICWA cases.1 14 To accept an Indian child into Minnesota from out
108. See INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN REGULATIONS §
12(6)(a)(5) (AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS'N 2012). Section 1915(b) placement preferences are a
matter of substantive law. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) ("States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into agreements
with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings, including agreements which may provide for orderly transfer ofjurisdiction on a case-
by-case basis and agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction between States and Indian
tribes.").
110. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, States and Their American Indian Citizens, 41 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 319, 335 (2017).
111. SHANNON KELLER O'LOUGHLIN, THE ASS'N ON AM. INDIAN AFFAIRS, A SURVEY AND
ANALYSIS OF TRIBAL-STATE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AGREEMENTS INCLUDING PROMISING
PRACTICES 2 (2017).
112. See In re E.G.M., 750 S.E.2d 857, 862 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (refusing to take judicial
notice of a memorandum of agreement between the state and tribe for ICWA's placement prefer-
ences because it was a legislative, not adjudicative, fact).
113. In re Parental Rights as to S.M.M.D., 272 P.3d 126, 131 (Nev. 2012).
114. See O'LOUGHLIN, supra note 111, at 85-86 (listing the tribal-state compacts of the Pe-
nobscot Indian Nation: Maine, Houlton Band of Maliseet-Maine, Saginaw Chippewa Tribe-
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of state, the placement preferences set out in both ICWA and the Minnesota
Indian Family Preservation Act must first be followed.115 If the placement is
outside of those preferences, the compact compels the Minnesota Department
of Human Services to reject the placement unless it meets the good-cause
exception.]16 When Minnesota wishes to place an Indian child outside of the
state, the state's Department of Human Services must send notice to the
child's tribe.117 Similarly, Michigan's compact with the Saginaw Chippewa
Tribe requires a strict application of ICWA, favoring tribal placement pref-
erences over the ICPC. 118
Sometimes, the compact can also provide a boon to tribal placement
preferences when dealing with other states that are not party to the tribal-state
compact and that normally require a full ICPC analysis regardless of the
child's Indian status. Minnesota's compact calls for the state to assist tribes
in placing Indian children out of state if that is where the tribe has decided to
place the child.119 The Saginaw Chippewa-Michigan compact calls for the
state to ensure that the tribe's specific preferences are followed.120 Addition-
ally, the Saginaw Chippewa-Michigan compact requires the state to verify
the tribe's placement preferences before accepting a child into Michigan.121
Unless a tribal-state ICWA compact directly discusses how to apply the ICPC
to existing ICWA cases exists, there is not always guidance on how to apply
the ICPC in ICWA cases.1 2 2
Today, some states have ICPC provisions that simply require compli-
ance with ICWA as a matter of ICPC procedure.123 Others have administra-
tive procedures that direct the application of ICPC to ICWA cases. For ex-
ample, Alabama's regulations explicitly state that the ICPC applies in ICWA
Michigan, Southern Ute Tribe-Colorado, and Minnesota tribes as the few tribal-state compacts that
mention the ICPC). Due to the similarities in these tribal-state compacts, this Article focuses on the
Minnesota and Saginaw Chippewa compacts for comparing and contrasting provisions.
115. MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNESOTA TRIBAUSTATE AGREEMENT 28 (2007)
[hereinafter Minnesota Tribal/State Agreement].
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. MICH. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TAM 310, SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN
TRIBE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE AGREEMENT 26 (2014) [hereinafter Saginaw Chippewa Agree-
ment].
119. Minnesota Tribal/State Agreement, supra note 115, at 29.
120. Saginaw Chippewa Agreement, supra note 118, at 26.
121. Id.
122. See 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (2012). Section 1919 allows tribes and states to enter into an
agreement on ICWA, and some states such as Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington all have com-
pacts that address the application of the interstate compact, while Alaska's tribal-state compact does
not. See O'LOUGHLN, supra note I11, at 85-86.
123. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.516 (2018); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-52-08(C)(1 1) (2018).
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cases even where a tribe assumes jurisdiction.124 For the purposes of the
ICPC, Alabama considers tribes sending states where they place children ei-
ther off- or on-reservation-and Alabama's regulations provide for tribal su-
pervision where tribes are involved in placement.125 When tribes are the
sending state, Alabama's regulations uphold the tribe's jurisdiction as the
sending state under the ICPC.126 Although Alabama structured its regulations
such that the ICPC's application does not conflict with a tribe's concurrent
jurisdiction under ICWA, the regulations still impose the ICPC's procedures
onto tribes.
Other states also regulate how the ICPC and ICWA interact with each
other. Oregon's regulations state that the "protections of the Indian Child
Welfare Act also apply to children who are subject to the protections of the
ICPC."127 Interestingly, this language frames the Indian Child Welfare Act,
a substantive and procedural law, as something that should be applied to a
state administrative procedure-not the other way around. For some states,
the application of the ICPC in ICWA cases comes down to funding - who
will pay for a child's placement and monitoring. Rhode Island, as an illustra-
tion, applies the ICPC and considers tribes sending states with regards to Title
IV-E placement funding.128
In 2001, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges ("the
Council") attempted to provide guidance on the interaction between the ICPC
and ICWA. The Council stated that the ICPC should not apply where an In-
dian child is placed interstate and on-reservation, unless other conditions re-
quire the ICPC's application.129 However, the ICPC should apply, the Coun-
cil believed, where an ICWA placement places a child interstate and off-
reservation.130 The Council's hair-splitting distinction in applying the ICPC
to ICWA cases seemingly relies upon traditional notions of federal suprem-
acy-not the ICPC's current manifestation as an instrument of state admin-
istrative regulations.131
124. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-36-.05(1)(a) (2018).
125. Id. r. 660-5-36-.05(1)(c).
126. Id. r. 660-5-36-.05(1)(d).
127. OR. ADMIN. R. 413-040-0200(1) (2018).
128. See R.I. CODE R. § 14-1-700-0170 (2018) (stating the ICPC applies to Title IV-E fund-
ing). But see R.I. CODE R. § 14-1-700.0060 (2018) (applying ICWA in ICPC cases, but not exempt-
ing or providing further guidance on how ICWA applies in ICPC cases).
129. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES & AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS.
ASS'N, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: A MANUAL AND
INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDE FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES 43 (Barbara Seibel ed., 2001).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 44 ("If ICPC implementation will interfere with placement of the Indian child
pursuant to placement requirements of the ICWA, the ICWA preempts the ICPC.").
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2. The Conflict Between Administrative Procedure and
Substantive Law
Applying the ICPC in ICWA cases, much like where the ICPC is applied
in noncustodial parent placements, creates a dual-layer intrusion into an In-
dian child's placement. The ICPC allows a receiving state to decide that an
otherwise valid, safe placement that a tribe proposes is not appropriate, and
neither the sending agency nor the placement is left with recourse in most
states. However, this clearly violates ICWA's fundamental mandate that
vests tribes with the power to be the arbiters of Indian children's best inter-
ests. Much like their state counterparts, tribes also have codes, regulations,
and procedures that provide for the evaluation of, and investigation into, a
child's placement.1 32
In one such South Dakota case, In re P.S.E.,133 the receiving state agency
denied an Indian child's placement, finding serious rehabilitative steps that
the parent needed to take to overcome substance abuse issues and become a
qualified placement. Thus, a South Dakota trial court eventually terminated
the parent's rights.134 The court made findings that active efforts were made
to reunite the family, but it was the parent's inability to become a qualified
placement in the receiving state that made the placement unattainable.135 On
appeal, the parent argued South Dakota had not made active efforts to reha-
bilitate and place his child with him, improperly terminating his parental
rights.136 The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the state made active
efforts to place the child with his parent, but the parent had not followed the
receiving state's mandates, making the placement impossible.137
While the South Dakota Supreme Court had serious issues concerning
his ability to parent in In re P.S.E., the case demonstrates how powerful ICPC
mandates are when applied to ICWA cases-where a compact is not in place.
132. See, e.g., COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES CODE § 5-2-374 (West 2011) (requiring an
investigative report on placement conditions within twenty days of the filing of an adoption peti-
tion); COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 640.130 (West 2013) (prescribing procedures for investi-
gation and child placement in abuse and neglect cases); PONCA TRIBE OF NEB. CODE § 4-8-9 (West
2011) (requiring a home study prior to the placement of a child for purposes of adoption);
SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE 13.2, § 11.0 (West 2010) (providing factors for when a child is need
of care, investigative procedures, and placement and dispositional procedures); WAGANAKISING
ODAWA TRIBAL CODE § 5.121 (West 2011) (mandating a dispositional review hearing every six
months, including the content the court must consider).
133. See generally In re P.S.E., 2012 S.D. 49, 816 N.W.2d 110.
134. Id at 9.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id at 18.
137. See id. at ¶¶ 23-26 ("Without an acceptable California homestudy, the Interstate Compact
on Placement of Children (ICPC) would not allow P.S.E. to be placed with Father in California.").
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Because the parent failed to complete the receiving state's compulsory steps
for its approval of his child's placement, the sending state eventually deemed
active reunification efforts satisfied under ICWA and terminated his rights.1 38
In this case, not only did the termination of the parent's rights raise serious
ICWA concerns, but the ICPC interfered with the parent's fundamental right
to parent.139 Here, a state administrative agency essentially determined
whether the parent was fit. Though the receiving state's ICPC determination
was not an adjudicative determination, that determination was nevertheless
used to terminate a parent's fundamental right to parent.
In re P.S.E. also demonstrates another conflict between ICWA and the
ICPC: the best interest of the child. As a term of art in family law, the best
interest of the child is a standard that courts use to determine child custody
matters, including the placement of children in child welfare proceedings.140
While some states have statutes that provide criteria that courts should, or
must, consider, the criteria is often subjective and left to the discretion of the
trial judge.141 Traditionally, the best interest of the child standard has led to
gender disparities in assigning child custody. 142 Where Indian children are
involved, acknowledging a child's cultural rights and the tribe's interest in
the child should be considered in the best interest of the child analysis.
143
For example, in New Mexico, trial courts must consider a non-exhaus-
tive list of five factors, including (1) the wishes of the child's parents; (2) the
wishes of the child; (3) the relationship between the child and his or her par-
ent, as well as the relationship with any siblings; (4) the child's adjustment
to home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and physical health of
all of those involved.144 Though this is a non-exhaustive list of factors, none
include a child's connection to his or her culture--or the cultural norms of a
138. Id.
139. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (defining the fundamental right to
parent).
140. See In re J.V., 314 Mont. 487, 490, 67 P.3d 242 (Mont. 2003) ("[T]he best interests of
the children are of paramount concern in a parental rights termination proceeding and take prece-
dence over the parental rights."); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455
A.2d 1313 (1983) (holding that the state's intervention in a family matter is warranted only where
it is in the best interest of the child); In re Lenore, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 275, 278,770 N.E.2d 598 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002) (holding that at a hearing to terminate parental rights, the focus is on the best interests
of the child in addition to the ability of the parent to provide care).
141. See Jason J. Reed, Comment, The Fagade of a Best Interest Standard: Moving Past the
Presumption to Ensure Decisions are Made for the Right Reasons, 29 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y
149, 155 (2014).
142. Id. at 157.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 2 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530 (recog-
nizing the need for placements that acknowledge a child's unique Indian culture).
144. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (2018).
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child's tribe. In many cases, a trial judge would likely consider an argument
made regarding a child's connection to his culture, but statutorily, the court
is not obligated to do so.
In an ICWA case, the statute provides a different, more culturally cog-
nizant and competent standard. In enacting ICWA, Congress found that pro-
tecting the interests of Indian children to be an important obligation it held as
a trustee in ensuring the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes.145
ICWA's provisions require courts to make findings that are beyond the sim-
ple subjective best interest of the child analysis that states require.146 In fact,
where removal proceedings are in place to remove a child from his parents,
or to terminate the parents' rights, ICWA requires findings at two different
stages to meet two different legal standards.147 To place a child in foster care,
the court must find there is clear and convincing evidence to support that
continued custody is not in the best interest of the child.148 When terminating
a parent's rights, the court must find there is evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that continued custody is not in the best interest of the child.149 Though
ICWA requires analysis beyond state-law best interest of the child standards,
again, this analysis is left to the discretion of a trial court that has numerous
factors to weigh.
In addition to the ICWA and state-law best interest of the child standards,
numerous tribal codes also have a best interest of the child standard. For ex-
ample, the Swinomish Tribe recognizes a child's tribal and cultural ties as
part of best interest of the child analysis-in addition to the factors that state
courts would consider regarding a child's emotional, physical, and mental
health.50 Similarly, the Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma's
code lists sixteen different factors that a court must consider in the placement
of a child, including factors such as the child's extended family's opinion on
the placement, the ability to relate to the natural parents, and the ability to
help a child return home when necessary.'5' Perhaps this is where the rubber
145. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2012) ("[T]here is no resource that
is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or
are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.").
146. See id. § 1912(e) (requiring clear and convincing evidence prior to placing an Indian child
in foster care); see also id. § 1912(f) (requiring evidence beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termi-
nating parental rights).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 1912(e).
149. Id. § 1912(f).
150. See SWINOMISH TRIBAL CODE § 7-04.010 (West 2018) ("The best interests of the child
are served by a parenting arrangement hat best maintains a child's emotional growth, tribal and
cultural ties, health and stability, and physical care.").
151. ABSENTEE SHAWNEE TRIBAL CODE § 415 (West 2011).
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meets the road in cases where the ICPC and ICWA intersect. Not only do
these tribes have best interest of the child standards, but the tribal standards
include the respective cultural analysis that state-court standards often do not
require. Where tribal best interest of the child standards exist, applying
nontribal standards is contrary to ICWA's mandate. Further, applying state
best interest of the child analysis to a placement case where a tribe has con-
current jurisdiction is contrary to tribal sovereignty.
At a minimum, receiving states must consider the cultural context of a
placement and why the ICWA mandate and/or tribal preferences are in the
best interest of an Indian child. While the receiving state completes its inves-
tigation into a placement, it is unclear how much of that investigation in-
volves an analysis that pertains to the best interests of the Indian child. That
is, while a sending state may do its due diligence in applying ICWA, the
receiving state's investigation is free to ignore ICWA, instead focusing on a
best interest analysis that lacks any mention of why a particular placement is
culturally appropriate. With the receiving state's denial, an Indian child may
not be placed in a culturally appropriate home, even where the sending state
has done its ICWA homework like in In re P.S.E.
Furthermore, where states apply ICPC provisions to noncustodial par-
ents, it is unclear if and how ICWA would apply. Where parents are engaged
in private custody disputes and states apply the ICPC to noncustodial parents
who live out of state, the compact supports treating the noncustodial parent
in the same manner as foster care and adoptive placements.152 In such sce-
narios, courts continuously support the spirit of securing a child's best inter-
ests and safety over a parent's right to parent.153 The ICPC implicates ICWA
in cases where a sending state wishes to place an Indian child with his or her
noncustodial parent living out of state. When a receiving state initiates an
investigation into a noncustodial parent to make its own determination as to
whether that child should be placed there, this is beyond the realm of a private
custody dispute between two parents. As it applies between two custodial
parents of an Indian child, the application of the ICPC compels ICWA to do
something that it was never meant to do: govern private custody disputes be-
tween two parents. For the purposes of ICWA, applying the ICPC in this
scenario is more akin to a state-driven dependency proceeding than a private
family court proceeding because of the receiving state agency's involvement
in the process.
152. See In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 530 (Mich. 2014) (defining the right to an adjudica-
tion of parental rights); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (defining the funda-
mental right to parent).
153. See generally Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
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Hypothetically, if a receiving state opens an investigation into a noncus-
todial parent simply because they live out of state, ICWA's provisions apply
to protect the parent's rights. Where the ICPC is applied to a noncustodial
parent living out of state, the application of the ICPC invites an attack on an
Indian parent's household where no previous abuse or neglect allegations ex-
ist.154 Applying the ICPC in a "one parent doctrine" scenario is akin to an
involuntary proceeding.ss Therefore, Section 1912 should govern the pro-
ceeding.156 Because ICWA requires states use certain procedural and sub-
stantive measures when breaking up an Indian family and placing an Indian
child, applying the ICPC here invokes significant ICWA protections in a cus-
tody dispute between two parents.
Though Congress did not intend for ICWA to apply to private custody
disputes between parents, Congress did intend to protect and maintain Indian
families. That is not to say that ICWA should extend beyond its purview.
Rather, the ICPC's ability to strip out-of-state, noncustodial parents of their
parental rights should invoke ICWA's procedural safeguards for parents of
Indian children, including applying heightened legal standards and employ-
ing a qualified expert witness. At the very least, the receiving state should
consider other factors particular to Indian children in its best interest analysis.
B. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN ICPC AND ICWA
Where ICWA applies, a jurisdictional question exists as to whether there
is conflict between the ICPC's retention of jurisdiction in the sending state
and ICWA's provisions allowing an Indian tribe to confer jurisdiction absent
good cause to transfer the case. Under ICWA, an Indian tribe may move for
a state court to transfer the child custody proceedings to a tribal court unless
a parent objects to the removal of the proceedings - tribes also have a right
of intervention in state child custody proceedings.157 Additionally, ICWA
calls for both state and tribal courts to afford full faith and credit to child
custody orders involving Indian children.158
154. See In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d at 531.
155. See id.
156. Cf Diego K. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 411 P.3d
622 (Alaska 2018) (holding that information from status hearing that did not comport with ICWA's
finding requirements could not support removing an Indian child from her parents); In re A.L.D.,
2018 MT 112, 19, 391 Mont. 273, ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 342, ¶ 9 (applying ICWA's active efforts in a case
where the state terminated parental rights); In re Anhayla H., 2018-NMSC-033, TT 37-38, 421 P.3d
814 (recognizing the fundamental right to parent and applying ICWA's clear and convincing stand-
ard of evidence to review whether the state properly terminated a parent's right).
157. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)-(c) (2012).
158. See id. § 1911(d).
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Although the ICPC governs child placement as an instrument of state
law, jurisdictional concerns create serious questions over whether the ICPC
should apply where ICWA governs a child's placement. The Uniform Child
Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") does not apply
where ICWA governs a child's placement.159 In at least one state, Kentucky,
application of the UCCJEA is expressly prohibited "to the extent that [the
proceeding] is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act."1 6 0 Additionally,
Kentucky law also expressly requires that under the UCCJEA, Indian Tribes
are treated as states.161 The UCCJEA is a uniform law, similar to the ICPC,
and forty-nine states have adopted it.162 Like the UCCJEA, the ICPC was
conceptualized as an instrument that states could implement to create uni-
formity in child placements across state lines. Unlike the UCCJEA, though,
some states such as South Dakota continue to apply ICPC requirements in
cases that fall under ICWA's purview.163
Where placement decisions fall under ICWA's purview, state courts
should treat the ICPC the same as they treat the UCCJEA: the ICPC should
not apply. For example, Kentucky's ICPC provision calls for the collapse of
the ICPC requirements where an Indian tribe petitions for and receives juris-
diction over a case.164 This model is ideal because it allows tribes retaining
ICWA jurisdiction to make their own determinations of where to place the
Indian child without further intrusion by state agencies-promoting tribal
sovereignty. While tribes and state agencies work together daily, Indian tribes
must maintain the ability to make decisions on the placement of their chil-
dren. Under Kentucky's model, the tribe is free to make its own placement
decision and determine whether to accept a child without inviting state offi-
cials to make the determination on its behalf. Without acknowledging an In-
dian tribe's ICWA status and interest in an Indian child, the ICPC ultimately
makes the child's tribe and two different states responsible for placement.
Not applying the ICPC in ICWA cases also alleviates other jurisdictional
concerns. Because Indian tribes are sovereigns, they generally retain the abil-
ity to make decisions on the placement of their members. Where the ICPC is
applied in ICWA cases, a third-party sovereign is invited to disrupt a tribe's
159. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF'T ACT § 104 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1997).
160. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.804(1) (West 2018).
161. Id § 403.804(2).
162. Jaye L. Samuels, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Child Custody and Support Issues: An




163. See In re P.S.E., 2012 S.D. 49, ¶¶ 29-30, 816 N.W.2d 110.
164. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 615.030 art. IV(4)(f) (West 2018) (effective June 25, 2013).
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sovereignty and determine a child's placement status. Conversely, in cases
affecting non-Indian children, both the sending and receiving states retain the
appropriate jurisdiction without abrogating either state's sovereignty. The ap-
plication of the ICPC in ICWA cases creates a third-party placement scenario
where a tribe and/or the sending agency may comply with ICWA, but the
receiving state, whose only involvement is the ICPC mandate, may abrogate
ICWA's guidelines and purpose, declining the application of a tribe's explicit
jurisdiction over the third-party placement of an Indian child. While this sce-
nario plays out between states from time to time when one state may reject
another's planned placement, the major distinction where an Indian child is
involved is that doing so contradicts ICWA's mandate.
C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE ICPC
Congress passed ICWA in 1978 to bring an end to the massive removal
of Indian children from their parents and relocation to placements with non-
Indian families.165 Even though ICWA sets out procedures for dealing with
the voluntary and involuntary removal of Indian children, ICWA remains
federal substantive law that seeks to protect the rights of Indian children and
families.166 Because ICWA is an instrument of federal law, and the ICPC is
an instrument of state law, when they interact the preemption doctrine poten-
tially applies.
Where Congress has either expressly or implicitly intended for a federal
law to completely occupy a field of law, a federal law will preempt any state
law that pertains to the same matter.167 In the case of ICWA, Congress has
not expressly stated that ICWA is intended to preempt state-law custody pro-
ceedings.168 Additionally, it does not appear that Congress intended for
ICWA to fully occupy and preempt state law on custody proceedings.169
Thus, courts look to whether conflict preemption exists.170 Where (1) it is
165. Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012)).
166. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
167. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
168. In re W.D.H., 43 S.W.3d 30, 36 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (citing In re Brandon M., 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 671, 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
169. See In re J.J.T., 544 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017) ("A state procedural rule
which would deny the right to intervene in a child custody proceeding because the tribe did not file
a written pleading prior to the hearing directly conflicts with this purpose."); see also In re K.S.D.,
2017 ND 289, ¶ 24, 904 N.W.2d 479 (stating that "ICWA does not alter the requirements for state
law proceedings, but instead requires . . . a higher burden of proof"); In re D.S.P., 480 N.W.2d 234,
238 (Wis. 1992) (holding that Congress did not intend ICWA to fully occupy the field of termination
of parental rights because ICWA's language on the burden of proof allows the use of state stand-
ards).
170. In re W.D.H., 43 S.W.3d at 36.
2019] 175
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEw
impossible to comply with both the federal and the state law, or (2) the state
law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional ob-
jectives, conflict preemption exists.1 71
When state law and procedure invoke the ICPC in an ICWA case, it is
impossible for courts to comply with both federal and state law. In a Texas
case, In re WD.H., the Texas Family Code conflicted with ICWA where its
standard for determining the best interest of the child was different from
ICWA's standard.172 Thus, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred when making a determination as to an Indian child's best interest
in an ICWA case using a state standard because it was impossible to comply
with the findings required under the Family Code and ICWA at the same
time.173 The court therefore found that ICWA preempted a state law that re-
quired more stringent findings for a child's best interests.174
Moreover, that the ICPC is an administrative procedure, while ICWA is
a federal substantive law, provides another conflict. Generally, state proce-
dural rules or statutes do not preempt ICWA's substantive provisions.175
Conversely, states recognize that while ICWA is a federal substantive law, it
does not contradict state rules of procedure.176 In an Iowa case, In re J.D.B.,
the Iowa Court of Appeals held that the respondent still had the duty to com-
ply with the state rules of appellate procedure in preserving an error for ap-
peal, in spite of the application of ICWA and its modifications on state child
custody law.177 However, the ICPC is vastly distinct from following state
rules of procedure; the ICPC is an administrative procedure where the only
parties who can actually comply are states. Without the application of a tribal-
state compact or statutory guidance, like Kentucky provides, the ICPC essen-
tially preempts ICWA's substantive provisions on placement preference. Be-
cause a receiving state can choose to ignore a tribe's placement preference,
the child's IWCA-approved placement is nullified.
Applying the ICPC in ICWA cases also provides a large obstacle to the
congressional goals of protecting the rights of Indian children and families.
171. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989).
172. In re W.D.H., 43 S.W.3d at 37.
173. Id. at 37-38.
174. Id.
175. See In re Desiree F., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding there is no
authority that "would permit a state procedural statute to preempt the substantive provisions of the
federal ICWA").
176. See In re J.D.B., 584 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in spite of
ICWA's application to a child custody case, the respondent still had to comply with state rules of
appellate procedure in preserving an error for appeal).
177. In re J.D.B., 584 N.W.2d at 581.
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As an administrative procedure, the ICPC further defines the placement pro-
cess in state court proceedings. However, ICWA, a federal substantive law,
already provides a placement procedure where the child in question is an In-
dian child.178 Congress, with its plenary authority over Indian affairs, man-
dated the appropriate placement preferences in 25 U.S.C. § 1915. Thus,
where states apply ICPC procedures in lieu of-or even in conjunction
with-ICWA's provisions, the states ignore this congressional mandate.
Though ICWA generally does not supplant state law, its purpose is not
to protect states' traditional jurisdiction, and the federal statute is not be-
holden to state law.1 79 For example, in In re Adoption of B.B.,80 the Utah
Supreme Court had to determine whether a biological father met the defini-
tion of a parent under ICWA.181 Under Utah state law, the biological father
did not meet the definition of a parent because he did not take the steps Utah
state law required to establish paternity.182 However, the Utah Supreme Court
held that Utah courts should have relied upon the federal definition of a par-
ent because Congress was silent and did not provide for a state or tribal law
definition of a parent.183 As the Utah Supreme Court noted in In re Adoption
ofB.B., applying a state legal standard to an ICWA case would lessen ICWA
protections in some cases.184 Thus, ICWA sometimes requires state-law def-
initions to give deference to federal legal standards. Where ICWA does not
provide the greatest protection to Indian families, the higher standard ap-
plies.8 5 But in a conflict between state law and ICWA, ICWA often provides
the greatest protections for Indian families and should therefore apply with-
out state-law constraints.
While this Article specifically discusses the ICPC and ICWA, dissimi-
larity and discord in state substantive law abounds in ICWA cases because
each state has its own standards for a variety of issues. But the key distinction
is that those conflicts stem from substantive state law, such as the definition
of paternity. Such substantive legal provisions provide further guidance in
implementing ICWA and adjudicating a child's placement. Here, however,
the ICPC acts as an administrative provision that is determined separately
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012).
179. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,43 (1989) ("Congress when
it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.").
180. 2017 UT 59, 417 P.3d 1.
181. Adoption ofB.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 2, 417 P.3d 1.
182. See id ¶68 (discussing Utah's establishment of paternity laws as "notoriously strict").
183. See id 60 ("Because Congress did not mandate a state or tribal law definition for
'acknowledge' or 'establish,' we can and should rely instead on a federal definition.").
184. See id.165-69.
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (2012).
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from adjudicative matters. Although states have codified the ICPC, it remains
an administrative procedure that every state coordinates through a state ad-
ministrative office, not through a court.186 For example, Washington's Chil-
dren's Administration-the agency that formulates the rules on how ICPC
applies in ICWA cases-handles ICPC evaluations.187
While generally administered through a state's executive branch as an
administrative process, the ICPC eventually directly impacts a court's deci-
sion-making process. In ICWA cases, this is incredibly dangerous because
this administrative decision removes the power from a state-court judge to
adjudicate the case under ICWA's purview while also following ICPC rec-
ommendations. Where the ICPC is applied to ICWA cases, the ICPC effec-
tively guts a state court's mandate to follow ICWA placement procedures by
implementing a superseding administrative procedure.
D. COUNTERMEASURES TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ICPC AND
ICWA
In general, states should look toward the ICPC's regulations. Though not
all states have adopted and promulgated the regulations, they contain guid-
ance that would help when placing children within their families. For exam-
ple, adopting Regulation No. 7 on the expedited interstate placement of chil-
dren within their family would lessen the ICPC's impact on a parent's rights
by removing intrafamily placements from the compact's scope. Additionally,
these regulations could provide greater uniformity amongst the states when
it comes to the situations in which the ICPC should and must be enforced.
With that said, applying the ICPC to a situation where a child is being placed
with a parent in another state continues to provide an attack on the funda-
mental right to parent, especially when the court has not adjudicated his or
her fitness.1 88
When ICWA and the ICPC apply to the same matter, Kentucky provides
a good model for deferring to ICWA's preferences. As sovereigns, tribes
have the right to make placement decisions for their member children. Tribal-
court judges do not make decisions as to a child's placement in a vacuum. To
the contrary, in identifying a placement, tribal courts rely upon the same pro-
cesses that state courts do. Like state courts, tribal courts also make inquiries
into the best interests of the child. Most importantly, tribal courts tend to be
the optimal arbiters of the best interests of an Indian child for a variety of
186. Guide to the ICPC, supra note 32, at 10.
187. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., supra note 69, at 5601(1)(a)(i)(B)
(discussing the ICPC process in the state of Washington).
188. See In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Mich. 2014).
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reasons that include knowledge of a child's family and cultural requirements.
In most states, only new state regulations could create such a model. Creating
regulations that define Indian child placements out of the state's ICPC pur-
view is more efficient than waiting for legislation to clearly define the ICPC's
and ICWA's roles where Indian children are concerned. State regulations pri-
oritizing tribal interests and defining how the ICPC and ICWA work together
are necessary.
Perhaps as a rather obvious legislative fix and countermeasure, Congress
could amend ICWA, or the BIA could implement regulations that provide
further guidance on whether the ICPC is applicable in ICWA cases and the
extent of its applicability. Through its trust responsibility to Indian tribes,
Congress certainly has the authority to enact such a law as it pertains to Indian
children. However, that is a rather lofty, long-term goal.
In the interim, one thing that tribes can do to protect their status in these
situations is to exercise their rights under 25 U.S.C. § 1919 and work with
states to create tribal-state ICWA compacts, similar to Minnesota or the Sagi-
naw Chippewa-Michigan agreements. Minnesota and Saginaw Chippewa-
Michigan both have tribal-state compacts that decline to apply the ICPC in
ICWA cases.1 89 A tribal-state compact, much like the ICPC itself, provides
guidance to state courts weighing whether the ICPC applies in an ICWA case.
Moreover, tribal governments should consider a tribal-state compact that ac-
tually defines placement preferences like the Saginaw Chippewa-Michigan
agreement does. Though the provisions of this agreement do no bind third-
party states, they do bind the State of Michigan to ensure that it defers to the
proper ICWA preferences when receiving a child into the state.
At the litigation stage, tribes can and should assert that ICWA preempts
the ICPC. Asserting that ICWA's concerns outweigh the ICPC is not com-
mandeering state law because ICWA continues to support and promote the
trust responsibility the federal government owes to Indian tribes. Deferring
to an ICWA placement in a case where the ICPC would otherwise apply for
a non-Indian child supports the adjudicative process that protects both Indian
families and tribal interests in familial relationships. When a state adminis-
trative agency is vested with the power to overrule an adjudicative decision
that ICWA demands, it is almost impossible to apply both ICWA and the
ICPC-and still achieve ICWA's goals. In addition to the problems with
achieving ICWA's goals, the potential for the ICPC to apply to private cus-
tody disputes between the parents of an Indian child calls into question
whether a parent's rights are violated and whether ICWA should apply to a
private custody dispute in ways it has not previously.
189. See supra notes 115, 118.
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V. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, ICWA and the ICPC conflict when applied to cases
concerning the placement of Indian children. ICWA is a federal law that pro-
vides both procedural and substantive legal standards for proceedings where
the state is placing an Indian child. The ICPC is an administrative tool that
state agencies use to ensure a placement is valid. In ensuring a child's safety,
the ICPC and ICWA act in the same field of law. The ICPC and ICWA have
complementary goals. However, the application of both the state administra-
tive procedure and the federal process in the same case does not complement
congressional goals to protect Indian children.
Generally, federal substantive law preempts state administrative proce-
dure. In the case of ICWA, Congress has spoken to define the placement
preferences for Indian children, as well as the forum that is entitled to make
this decision. Additionally, Congress has spoken to allow tribal-state com-
pacts where two sovereigns come to an agreement on the placement of Indian
children. Congress certainly did not intend to preempt all state law as applied
to Indian families, but it did intend to regulate how the states and their ad-
ministrative agencies would interact with Indian families. Accordingly,
where ICWA applies, state courts and agencies should provide absolute def-
erence to ICWA's tribal placement preferences. Much like states, tribes are
sovereigns that are generally equipped to evaluate and place a child. In fact,
where Indian children are concerned, tribes are the best equipped to make
these decisions after evaluating a child's kinship ties and cultural needs in the
best interest of the child analysis.
Now, this Article does not argue that tribes and states should refuse to
work together to seek placement solutions for Indian children. As it stands,
ICWA regulates state courts in its dealings with Indian children, and it re-
quires a working relationship between states and tribes. However, this rela-
tionship is severely imbalanced when state administrative agencies assert su-
premacy over tribal placement preferences through the ICPC, working
contrary to ICWA's goals. Certainly, the ICPC and ICWA could collaborate
to further each other's goals for child welfare. However, without the proper
guidance, there is a large void where the ICPC and ICWA conflict.
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